Saturday, 22 January 2011
لبنان : غلاء لا يرحم , تلاعب التجار بالاسعار , امتيازات احتكارية , و تواطؤ الدولة
Friday, 29 October 2010
Zokak El-Blat: a step towards the preservation of Lebanese heritage?
The two questions that spur to mind now are: (1) will the government, which has taken years to claim property of these sites, act quickly and take over control before contractors lay their hands on these houses? Or will it be bribed into slow-motion until it's too late?
Having said that, activists and admirers of Beirut's endangered heritage will undoubtedly celebrate the good news - and they have the right to! But they mustn't get too excited! These two houses were only appropriated by the government because there has been no claims of ownerships by heirs of their founders and their inheritors.
Friday, 18 June 2010
هناك من يحتفل بترقية جديدة كلّما «اصطفلنا»
«يصطفل» رشيد الضعيف
بقلم خالد صاغية
«يصطفل» رشيد الضعيف. بإمكانه أن يكتب ما شاء من الروايات، وأن يستهدف كلّ الفسحات بين المرأة والرجل. لكنّ رجالاً سيأتون بلباسهم العسكريّ ذات يوم، ليمنعوا صعود شخصيّاته إلى الخشبة.
«تصطفل» الجالية السودانيّة في لبنان. بإمكانها أن تمتلك حسّاً عالياً من المسؤوليّة، فتنظّم حفلاً لجمع التبرّعات من أجل طفل مصاب بالسرطان. لكنّ رجالاً سيأتون بلباسهم العسكريّ ذات يوم، ليسخروا من لون المحتفلين ومن أغانيهم وملابسهم الملوّنة. فإنقاذ طفل في لبنان يحتاج إلى ترخيص.
«يصطفلوا الفلسطينيّي». بإمكانهم أن يطالبوا بحقوقهم المدنية أو الإنسانيّة من الآن وحتّى قيام الساعة. لكنّ رجالاً سيأتون بربطات عنق ذات يوم، ليعطوا دروساً في حقوق الإنسان التي يجب أن تبقى حكراً على أصحاب الدم الأزرق.
«تصطفل» رابطة الأساتذة. بإمكانها أن تصرّ على أنّ العمل النقابي ما زالت له مساحته في هذا العالم. وبإمكانها أن تعتبر مطالبها محقّة. لكنّ مثقّفي السلطان سيأتون ذات يوم، ليحجبوا عنهم حقوقهم. فالقانون لم يوضع دائماً من أجل التطبيق، والحقوق لا تعطى إلا للحاشية ولروابط الطوائف. الدولة لديها ما يكفي لتنفقه على رحلات الرؤساء العقيمة، وعلى إشباع نهم حيتان المال، أمّا الأساتذة فلينتظروا جيلاً آخر.
«يصطفلوا» السريلانكيات. بإمكانهنّ ألا يتحمّلن الإهانات والتعذيب، وأن يعتبرن حياتهنّ غير قابلة للاستمرار. لهذا السبب، أقمنا في بيوتنا شرفات. فليرمين أجسادهنّ منها.
«يصطفل» اللبنانيّون جميعاً. ستقرّ الموازنة هذا المساء. وسيفقد مزيد من المواطنين حصانتهم أمام الضغط المعيشي، فيما تحمى المضاربات العقارية بقوانين إضافيّة. وسيأتي خبراء ذات يوم، يتأبّطون ملفّات كثيرة ليقنعونا ببيع ممتلكات الدولة، وبالحاجة إلى المزيد من الاستدانة، وبأن نطلق النار على أرجلنا. في تلك اللحظة التي نضغط فيها على الزناد ونصرخ «آخ»، سنعلم أنّ هناك من لن «يصطفل». أنّ هناك من يحتفل بترقية جديدة كلّما «اصطفلنا». وهناك من يحتفل بثروة جديدة كلّما «اصطفلنا». وهناك مدينة تخسر اسمها لا يمكن أن نتفرّج عليها وهي «تصطفل».
Al-Akhbar, 18.06.2010
«يصطفل» رشيد الضعيف
بقلم خالد صاغية
«يصطفل» رشيد الضعيف. بإمكانه أن يكتب ما شاء من الروايات، وأن يستهدف كلّ الفسحات بين المرأة والرجل. لكنّ رجالاً سيأتون بلباسهم العسكريّ ذات يوم، ليمنعوا صعود شخصيّاته إلى الخشبة.
«تصطفل» الجالية السودانيّة في لبنان. بإمكانها أن تمتلك حسّاً عالياً من المسؤوليّة، فتنظّم حفلاً لجمع التبرّعات من أجل طفل مصاب بالسرطان. لكنّ رجالاً سيأتون بلباسهم العسكريّ ذات يوم، ليسخروا من لون المحتفلين ومن أغانيهم وملابسهم الملوّنة. فإنقاذ طفل في لبنان يحتاج إلى ترخيص.
«يصطفلوا الفلسطينيّي». بإمكانهم أن يطالبوا بحقوقهم المدنية أو الإنسانيّة من الآن وحتّى قيام الساعة. لكنّ رجالاً سيأتون بربطات عنق ذات يوم، ليعطوا دروساً في حقوق الإنسان التي يجب أن تبقى حكراً على أصحاب الدم الأزرق.
«تصطفل» رابطة الأساتذة. بإمكانها أن تصرّ على أنّ العمل النقابي ما زالت له مساحته في هذا العالم. وبإمكانها أن تعتبر مطالبها محقّة. لكنّ مثقّفي السلطان سيأتون ذات يوم، ليحجبوا عنهم حقوقهم. فالقانون لم يوضع دائماً من أجل التطبيق، والحقوق لا تعطى إلا للحاشية ولروابط الطوائف. الدولة لديها ما يكفي لتنفقه على رحلات الرؤساء العقيمة، وعلى إشباع نهم حيتان المال، أمّا الأساتذة فلينتظروا جيلاً آخر.
«يصطفلوا» السريلانكيات. بإمكانهنّ ألا يتحمّلن الإهانات والتعذيب، وأن يعتبرن حياتهنّ غير قابلة للاستمرار. لهذا السبب، أقمنا في بيوتنا شرفات. فليرمين أجسادهنّ منها.
«يصطفل» اللبنانيّون جميعاً. ستقرّ الموازنة هذا المساء. وسيفقد مزيد من المواطنين حصانتهم أمام الضغط المعيشي، فيما تحمى المضاربات العقارية بقوانين إضافيّة. وسيأتي خبراء ذات يوم، يتأبّطون ملفّات كثيرة ليقنعونا ببيع ممتلكات الدولة، وبالحاجة إلى المزيد من الاستدانة، وبأن نطلق النار على أرجلنا. في تلك اللحظة التي نضغط فيها على الزناد ونصرخ «آخ»، سنعلم أنّ هناك من لن «يصطفل». أنّ هناك من يحتفل بترقية جديدة كلّما «اصطفلنا». وهناك من يحتفل بثروة جديدة كلّما «اصطفلنا». وهناك مدينة تخسر اسمها لا يمكن أن نتفرّج عليها وهي «تصطفل».
Al-Akhbar, 18.06.2010
Wednesday, 2 June 2010
لأهلي و اشقائي و رفاق دربي في لبنان - اشتقتلكن
Thursday, 27 May 2010
L'Orient Le Jour : Un groupe de jeunes décidé à sauver la mémoire de Beyrouth
Beyrouth, un patrimoine riche en danger.
Trouver une fonction nouvelle à ces maisons
Mais tout n'est pas que nostalgie chez ces jeunes. Ils réfléchissent aujourd'hui à de véritables solutions à proposer et sont désormais affiliés à l'Apsad qui, disent-ils, a adopté leurs actions. «Il faut surtout trouver une nouvelle fonction à ces anciennes maisons qui permette à leurs propriétaires de les garder et éloigne les visées d'investisseurs peu soucieux du patrimoine, souligne Naji. Si ces maisons continuent à vivre, elles seront sauvées. L'une des solutions est de les louer en tant que "maisons de communautés", à des personnes ayant un projet: artistes, designers...»
Alexandre insiste une nouvelle fois sur la nécessité de l'existence d'un plan de développement urbain. «Il faut mettre un terme au chaos dans la construction, dit-il. Même les nouveaux bâtiments doivent être en harmonie avec le caractère du quartier. Beyrouth est déjà saturé comme cela, et les étrangers nous font souvent remarquer combien la ville est devenue laide.»
Naji souligne qu'il y a beaucoup de solutions entre l'argent facile et immédiat et la préservation pure et dure du patrimoine bâti. «Il ne faut pas penser que la société y gagne quoi que ce soit, affirme-t-il. Les anciennes demeures gagnent en valeur avec le temps, contrairement aux nouvelles tours qui en perdront. Même les propriétaires qui vendent leurs domiciles actuellement ne se rendent pas compte que cela ne leur apporte pas suffisamment de bénéfices pour acheter ailleurs, ils sont donc souvent lésés. Leurs voisins le sont aussi, par la perte de caractère de leur rue.»
Concrètement, quelles sont les actions prévues par le groupe qui couvrent autant Achrafieh que d'autres quartiers, comme Zokak el-Blat ou Hamra? Naji et Alexandre parlent de sensibilisation du public par les sit-in, les affiches, les contacts avec les médias, la collaboration avec l'Apsad ou encore l'Association de développement de Gemmayzé (ADG), qui met à leur disposition une maison pour abriter leurs activités, et enfin la perspective d'une réunion d'architectes pour trouver des solutions alternatives. Les jeunes fourmillent d'idées et parlent de rentrer en contact, autant que possible, avec des investisseurs plus sensibles à l'importance du patrimoine.
Le pratique face au lucratif
Ce qui frappe chez ces jeunes militants, c'est leur passion pour les vieilles pierres que tant de leurs aînés n'hésitent pas à abattre. Et leur révolte est bien palpable. «Pourquoi le classement de tant de maisons est-il en train de passer de A à C, ce qui les rend instantanément candidats à la démolition?», se demande Naji. «Si ça continue, la ville sera vidée de ses habitants qui ne pourront plus y habiter et se transformera peu à peu en ville fantôme, sans âme, poursuit Alexandre. Notre but n'est pas de céder à la nostalgie et de vivre comme il y a quarante ans, mais de pousser les gens à repenser leur ville et à adopter un plan de zoning viable. Dans tous les pays du monde, il y a des quartiers préservés.»
Et quel est leur plan pour répondre, avec le peu de moyens dont ils disposent, aux formidables pressions qui leur font face? Les deux jeunes hommes parlent beaucoup de persuasion, de sensibilisation et, surtout, de solutions alternatives. Ils rappellent qu'il existe un projet de loi pour la protection des vieilles demeures préparé par l'Apsad, mais qu'il n'a toujours pas été adopté.
Tuesday, 25 May 2010
Calls for Separation of Religion and State at Secular Demonstration in Lebanon
Reporter: Lebanon is considered a liberal country, compared to its neighbors, and if its location in a generally conservative region is taken into account. Nevertheless, religion plays an essential role in its political system, and this has a negative impact on civil life sometimes. Even if the general character of the Lebanese is primarily determined by their sectarian affiliation, some of them refuse to let their sects determine their personal lives. Since for them, secularism is the solution, the secular people took to the streets of Beirut under this slogan, demanding the separation of religion and state.
Demonstrators carry signs, with the slogans:
"What's my sect? None of your business."
"Fatima and Tony are in love... That's a problem."
Demonstrator: We intend to abolish sectarian politics by separating religion and state. In our parliament, seats are allocated on a sectarian basis. We want it to be according to a proportional system.
In the world, secularism means complete removal of religion. That is not what we want. One's religion is a personal matter. "What's my sect? None of your business."
Reporter: The secularists' demand for separation of religion and state has several reasons, including the wars caused by sectarianism, the dead, the wounded, and the damage to all aspects of life, as well as the negative consequences to the lives of the citizens, especially when it comes to personal status laws, such as those pertaining to divorce and inheritance, subject to the courts of each sect. This is probably the greatest obstacle that sectarianism imposes on the lives of these young people, who consider civil marriage, for example, to be a solution to many problems faced by couples of different religions.
Demonstrator carries a sign with the slogan:
"Sectarianism is the filthy work of Satan... Avoid it."
Reporter: This is what leads them to make the 30-minute trip to Cyprus, in order to get married in a civil ceremony.
Demonstrator: Anybody who cares about secularism in Lebanon should be here today, so we can show our real numbers. This will raise awareness and make people talk about secularism. The Lebanese don't know what secularism is. They are afraid of it. They are afraid that secularism will deny them their religion.
Reporter: The demonstration, which included signs describing the negative aspects of sectarianism, was predominated by women. Women suffer severe discrimination under the laws of the various sects, and despite the efforts and activities of the NGOs, the people in charge refrain from taking any action.
The only exception is the initiative of Minister of the Interior Ziyad Baroud, who removed sectarian affiliation from ID cards. Many people view this measure as a new starting point for a country with 18 different sects. This, however, has remained the only measure taken, due to various considerations of the politicians and religious leaders.
Tuesday, 4 May 2010
Fouad G Marei on MEPEI: "Political Shi'ism: from engaging the state to replacing it"
“The essence behind the survival of nations is [social] justice and [citizen’s] dignity [...] we will start a new chapter in Lebanese history by pursuing the rights of those who are suffering dispossession1.”
By Fouad Gehad Marei
The birth of Political Shi’ism: Al-Sadr and the dispossessed
With these words, Imam Musa Al-Sadr outlined the essence of his movement and unveiled a new phase in the political life of Lebanon’s Shi’a community. Borne out of the deprivation and marginalisation of the Shi’a community in Beirut’s poverty belts, Al-Sadr’s charisma and his emphasis on the “injustice of negligence and dispossession” resonated with tens of thousands of Shi’ites in Lebanon.
Al-Sadr’s appearance on the Shi’a political arena in Lebanon, however, coincided with the collapse of the feudal elite that governed the community and a substantial shift in the community’s political life. The community’s detachment from the mountains, valleys and agriculture of Jabal Amel and the Beqaa and mass migration to the more urban settings of Beirut, Baalbeck and Tyre introduced a new political player within whose ranks Shi’ites enrolled. The self-professed “democratic, progressive and non-sectarian” outlook of the pan-Arab and leftist parties and militias and their struggle against Maronite hegemony and Lebanese isolationism inevitably resonated with the cultural and socio-political convictions and aspirations of many in the Shi’a community throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. In turn, the Lebanese left provided the more ambitious Shi’ites unprecedented access to new economic cycles, new modes of production and most importantly, education.
Nevertheless, the community’s engagement in the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and the upward mobility this movement offered many Shi’ites didn’t prevent the Sadrist movement from developing into an ethno-sectarian alternative for the Shi’ites in the form of Harakat Al-Mahrumin (Movement of the Dispossessed) in 1974 and its military wing, Amal, in 1975. The materialization of this ethno-sectarian alternative to the LNM proved instrumental in the aftermath of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1977 and the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt which ushered in a new phase of civil conflict in Lebanon – one in which the LNM itself would disintegrate into subdivisions divided along confessional lines.
With the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) turning almost exclusively towards its Druze community for support, the Nasserites to the Sunnis and the Christians to (forced) migration from West to East Beirut – the Shi’ites would find resort and sanctuary in Musa Al-Sadr and Amal’s militias in the late 1970s.
Al-Sadr’s emergence on the Shi’a political scene in Lebanon in the early 1970s and the birth of Harakat Al-Mahrumin also played a central role in linking the poverty belts of Lebanon’s Shi’a community with the revolutionary winds of Shi’a revisionism coming from the seminaries of Qom in the run-up to the Islamic Revolution in Iran.
Replacing the State
But the fundamental question more than three decades after Al-Sadr’s mysterious disappearance is, to what extent does the political discourse of Musa Al-Sadr relate to the contemporary Shi’a reality? Are the Shi’ites as deprived and marginalised as they were at the birth of Sadrist Political Shi’ism?
This question remained the backdrop of my study of the political economy of contemporary Political Shi’ism which suggested that fundamental departures from the perceived deprivation and dispossession of the first half of the twentieth century characterise the Shi’a reality today.
In response to my curious investigation, I came across a disciple of Al-Sadr and former Amal activist and ideologue who pointed me towards what he called “the lost opportunity” of the 1990s and its impact on shaping the evolution of Political Shi’ism in Lebanon. For him, Al-Sadr and Amal aspired to “invade the state and carve out a space in the administration for the Shi'a, not out of sectarian motivations but to reform the relationship between the state and the Shi’a community, and to engage the latter in the cross-confessional political and economic life of Lebanon.”
This can perhaps be seen clearly in the developmental achievements and infrastructural improvements in South Lebanon which were only made possible through Nabih Berri’s grip on state funds and agencies (such as Majles Al-Janoub). Nevertheless, Amal failed to raise the more competent individuals from within the Shi'a community to the relevant administrative and political positions of the state before being plagued with the corruption and favouritism for which Imam Musa Al-Sadr had criticised the sectarian system.
Consequently, the Shi’a community’s aspiration and enthusiasm towards engaging the state and its institutions or seeking employment in the civil service and public sector gradually withered away throughout the 1990s. This however, wasn’t solely a product of the corrupt and inefficient Shi’a civil servants – nor was it borne in a Shi’a vacuum away from national and cross-confessional realities. This Shi’a heedlessness and indifference towards the state in post-war Lebanon was perhaps a product of three fundamental changes which tainted political life in post-war Lebanon. Firstly, the undermining of the President Fouad Chihab’s étatist project at the beginning of the Civil War and the emergence of a neo-liberal state in the aftermath of the Taïf Accord reduced the political will to enlarge the state apparatus and increase efficiency and effectiveness of state institutions to provide public goods and services, rehabilitate and equip the post-war generation with the competences needed in the post-war economy, or develop and reform the education system. Similarly, the structure and contract of the post-war Lebanese state allowed the emergence of private (or multinational) business-geared empires to overtake the provision of public goods and services rendering the state unnecessary2.
Secondly, the reestablishment of transnational networks connecting the wealthy Shi’a diaspora in West Africa with the sending communities in Lebanon further changed the expectations of the Shi’a community towards the state. Unlike Al-Sadr, Shi’ites in the 1990s looked towards emigrant relatives and transnational migrant networks to address development issues; reconstruct war-torn villages and neighbourhoods; create employment opportunities and provide the capital necessary to reinvigorate life in the economic cycles of the Shi’a community often through the establishment of numerous, small-scale and diversified family businesses employing immediate relatives and generating profits to support immediate family members.
Both the erosion of the state and the rise of a Shiá “private sector welfare system” coincided with the rise of an Islamist competitor on the Shi’a political scene whose ideologues perceived engagement with the state with reluctance and ambiguity. For Hezbollah’s leadership, engagement with the state and its institutions could only introduce corrupt practices and favouritism into its tightly-knit ranks as it had done with Amal. This belief, coupled with the militant nature of Hezbollah’s struggle against Israel, justified the establishment of parallel institutions replicating, or even replacing, their public (state) counterparts to address the immediate, developmental and social concerns of the Shi’a constituency.
Nonetheless, the transformation of Political Shi’ism from a movement protesting state negligence and demanding a larger share in the jobs, investments and public goods and services provided by the state to a movement offering its following a viable alternative to the state served, invoked the uneasy relationship and detachment between the state and the Shi’a – a central pillar of the Sadrist movement since the early 1970s.
Addressing the concerns of a new clientele
The transformation and evolution of Political Shi’ism in Lebanon since the 1970s is not confined to the nature of the relationship between the state and its Shi’a constituents. The evolution of Political Shi’ism has been closely tied to the evolution of Shi’a self-perceptions and the way Shi’ites perceive their socio-economic status as a collectivity vis-à-vis other confessional groups in Lebanon (and sometimes, in the region at large).
Although a large Shi’a population continues to constitute a peripheral poverty belt around Beirut centred around Al-Ouzaï, Hay El-Sollom and El-Khandaq El-Ghamiq; the Shi’a-majority northern Beqaa Valley continues to suffer state negligence and severe under-development; South Lebanon remains vulnerable in the absence of a national army capable of defending Lebanon; and although other ethno-sectarian communities continue to view themselves as culturally and intellectually superior to the Shi’a community – the Shi’a community’s self-perception has changed since the mid-1990s.
An observer can easily notice that many Shi’ites no longer feel their community is the deprived, dispossessed community Al-Sadr spoke of in the 1970s. Remarkably perhaps, even the poorer Shi’ites living in the very poverty belts Al-Sadr revolted for seem to carry a different perception of their ethno-sectarian community – at least vis-à-vis the Maronite or Sunni communities. Some observers even suggest that the Shi’a community today fells “over-possessed” or is experiencing a phase of “perceived superiority” and feel they – as a Shi’a collectivity – possess self-sufficient, or even excessive power and wealth.
This fundamental change in the way members of the Shi’a community perceive their confessional collectivity is justifiable given the community’s realisation that it has demographically outnumbered the dwindling Maronite and Sunni communities, and that it too can draw on transnational networks (migrants and foreign states) to propel their domestic position. Furthermore, the translation of the military victories of Hezbollah – its ability to force an unconditional Israeli withdrawal in 2000 and its ability to withstand and deter Israel in 2006 – into a source of communal pride, power and advantage have all furthered the Shi’a community’s favourable self-perception.
It is therefore important to understand the political economy, collective communal psychology and the occupational and educational backgrounds of the clientele, or audience, of Shi’a political movements today, if one is to speak of understanding the trajectories and prospects of Political Shi’ism in the foreseeable future.
***
Notes:
1. From a speech delivered by Imam Musa Al-Sadr in a Ashura sermon. the speech was delivered in the South Lebanese village of Yater, Caza of Bint Jbeil, on 3 January 1974 (translated by the author with regard to the context)
2. More than one politician and intellectual from both the March 14 and March 8 camps made specific reference to what they called "the Harriri Empire", "the Harriri Apparatus" or "the Harriri Phenomenon" in the context of discussins post-war Lebanon and the emergence of influential politicians with strong, transnational business interests.
------------------------------------------------
Fouad Gehad Marei is a Doctoral Fellow at Durham University. His research focuses on civil society, political economy and political Shi’ism in Lebanon. His other research interests include Islamic political thought, international political economy, Egypt, Iran, Central Asia, progressive Islam, Sufism, Shi'ism and freedom of expression.
Fouad holds an M.A in International Relations from Durham University, UK. He has since worked with NGOs and advocacy groups in Egypt, Lebanon, Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East on issues ranging from freedom of expression to human rights and the rule of law. Fouad is a research affiliate at the Lebanese Emigration Research Center (Notre Dame University in Louaizé, Lebanon) and a Visiting Research Associate at the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies (CAMES – American University in Beirut), a member of the British Institute for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES) and the Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL).
Monday, 3 May 2010
Cries of a nostalgic Beiruti :: "Achrafiyieh needs your help"
Qasr Aker, Zokak El-Blat, is to be demolished in the very near future
I'm finding it hard to go for a walk in Ashrafyeh specially the old area where u can find some peace and maybe look at some beautiful places hidden (not any more).
I cant do nothing but to stop taking long walks in the small streets of Ashrafyeh. Where [is] the municipality, where [is] the foundations of society who should stand to this chaos. Where are the minds of our people?
Guess u all know where are they, discussing shitty politics, and running for ideologies. While easily they can start by looking at whats happening all across the city from Tabaris to around Sassine.
When my battle will start?
Who will help me?
Where are my memories going ........
So sad ,cause no one is looking, but me.
They're looking at their pockets instead.
Money cannot buy memories and feelings
Ashrafyeh needs your help.
Shame on those who are selling their old buildings .for some money .and some pride
And a message to Convivium Residences, instead of building new old looking buildings and stealing money from the buyers, renovate and innovate new solutions for the old buildings, who are the soul of this city.
